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Abstract 
According to the basic guidelines on reforming the electricity sector, approved by Russian 
Government, after several years the formation of the competitive wholesale power market in Russia 
will be finished and the regulation of tariffs for power will be terminated. The introduction of the 
competitive restructuring in the electricity industry inspired a set of concerns about the market 
power. Large firms may find it profitable to reduce output, exhaust the capacity of competitors, and 
exploit their dominant position on the residual demand. However, Russian Government and RAO 
EES plan several merges in the industry, e.g. in Middle Volga and Northwest region, which will 
increase market power of new entities and will lead to electricity price growth. Authors will exam-
ine using supply function equilibrium approach the consequence for efficiency of different choice 
for the structure of the industry in terms of suppliers concentration after the reform and the possible 
need for regulation.   
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OBJECTIVES 
Basic Guidelines on Reforming the Electricity Sector of the Russian Federation was approved 
by government on July, 11 2001 [30]. During the first stage of reform (within 3 years) mechanisms 
for a competitive wholesale power market will be developed. About 5-15% of electricity will be 
traded at the wholesale market at non-regulated price. Second stage of the reform will take 2-3 
years and it will be the period of introduction of the wholesale and retail power markets within the 
European, Urals and Siberian energy zones. At that stage the formation of the competitive whole-
sale power market will be finished, the regulation of tariffs for power will be terminated and regula-
tion of tariffs for transmission and system services will be retained.  
The main purpose of this research is to apply economic theory and empirical methods to the 
analysis of electricity markets, and to analyze proposed changes in Russian market structure and 
evaluate them in light of theoretical considerations and empirical evidence. As a result, we can find 
the scope for rising prices above the efficient level and possible structural changes to reduce this 
inefficiency to modest levels. 
CURRENT DEBATE 
Previous works have identified non price-taking behavior of firms in deregulated elec-
tricity markets. By analyzing comparative static relationships implied by theoretical models of oli-
gopoly pricing, Puller (2001) estimates behavioral models of firm conduct and finds strong evi-
dence that firms do not behave as price-takers but rather exercise static market power. Direct 
measures of price-cost margins in the UK market (Wolfram(1998)) and the California mar-
ket (Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2000)) find prices higher than those associated with 
Bertrand pricing but lower than levels associated with joint profit maximization. Models of 
dynamic interaction show that firms in an industry with entry barriers can sustain prices 
higher than one-shot equilibrium levels. If demand shocks are not observed ex post, Green 
and Porter (1984) show that firms can sustain prices above Cournot levels during periods 
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of high demand but may revert to static equilibrium prices following negative demand 
shocks. However, if demand and prices are observed ex post, firms always can sustain the 
collusive regime but the level of collusion will depend upon current and expected future 
demand (Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991)) and whether 
firms face capacity constraints (Brock and Scheinkman (1985)). For example, if current 
demand is high, the incentives to cut the price and earn deviation profits are high, so the 
price must be lowered to check that incentive. Similarly, if demand is expected to rise in 
the near future, the future collusive profits may be higher and firms have less incentive to 
deviate and start a price war. Johnsen, Verma, and Wolfram (1999) found some empirical evi-
dence that prices in local markets are higher during constrained periods when demand is less elastic 
in the day-ahead electricity market in Norway.  
Wolak (1997) argues that the market rules governing the operation of a restructured electricity 
market in combination with its market structure can have a substantial impact on the behavior of 
market-clearing prices. Using evidence on the design of electricity markets in England and Wales, 
Norway, the state of Victoria in Australia and New Zealand, he illustrates that market structure and 
market rules are important drivers of the behavior of prices in a competitive electricity market. One 
conclusion to emerge from this comparison is that there are many differences in how these markets 
in each country are organized. He also provides an assessment of the relationship between market 
rules and market structure and the behavior of prices in each market.  
The introduction of competitive restructuring in the electricity industry inspired a new set of 
concerns about market power. In USA and UK even in areas with significant independent and mu-
nicipally owned generation capacity, large firms may still find it profitable to reduce output, exhaust 
the capacity of these competitors, and exploit their dominant position on the residual demand.1 Con-
                                                 
1 Von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) argue that these considerations are result of the nature of competition in the 
United Kingdom. Wolak and Patrick (1997) provide empirical evidence that supports this argument. 
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cerns over market power in USA had been sufficient to prevent a proposed merger between South-
ern California Edison and San Diego Gas & Electric Co. in 1989.1 In Russia the structural changes 
have already started. We should analyze the consequences of those structural changes before the 
market liberalization, not after. In this research we will analyze the possible structures and competi-
tive outlook of the Russian electricity market. The results of our research will help to compare dif-
ferent ways of structural changes and divestitures in terms of electricity prices and market power.  
Similarly, before privatization in the UK, a number of commentators examined the conse-
quence for efficiency of different choice for the structure of the industry after the privatization and 
the possible need for regulation. Henney (1987) argued that the CEGB should be split into nine or 
10 separate companies and that none of these should be allow to grow subsequently to the point at 
which it would supply more than 20 percent of market. Sykes and Robinson (1987) claimed that 
Henney’s proposal could not be accomplished within the time scale required by political considera-
tions, but they proposed another mechanism that would have eventually created five or six compet-
ing generators. However, it was believed that the two major generating companies - National Power 
and PowerGen - would compete on price as ‘Bertrand’ oligopolists, and the resulting fierce compe-
tition would result in prices being bid down to near marginal costs. And second, that free entry into 
generation - in particular using high-efficiency combined cycle gas turbine technology (CCGTs) - 
would be simple and quick and place further strong competitive pressures on the incumbent genera-
tors to price competitively. These expectations have not been borne out by experience however. 
Pool prices in England and Wales have been significantly higher than they would have been in a 
competitive market, and the regulator has now intervened on numerous occasions to prevent certain 
types of manipulation of the pool pricing mechanism from occurring. So, it is reasonable to analyze 
                                                 
1 See Frankena and Owen (1994) 
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the possible behavior of generation companies in Russia and the structure of wholesale electricity 
market before the end of the reform.  
DESCRIPTION OF THE RUSSIAN WHOLESALE MARKET  
Goals of the restructuring energy sector in Russia  
Goals and prerequisites of the reform have evolved a lot of debates about conception of re-
structuring, as a result, more than 10 conceptions of restructuring were created. Andersen report 
(2001) contains goals and prerequisites approved by Government of Russia and RAO UES Rossii. 
Below we refer to most important ones: 
1. Without substantial increases in electricity supply and/or decrease in projected demand, 
and improved operational management, Russian regions may suffer severe electricity 
shortages as early as the winter of 2002-3. 
2. Russia's electricity industry is stagnant and inefficient and unless fundamentally re-
formed, its inefficient operation and investment will impose increasingly substantial, 
unnecessary cost on the Russian economy. 
3. Actions of the Government of Russia over the past 9 years are largely responsible for 
the industry's poor condition and dangerous prospects as it: 
• Failed to put effective independent regulatory arrangements in place. 
• Failed to privatize control of electricity generation and supply companies, which 
would have enabled these companies to attract private capital, technology and man-
agement, and the Government of Russia to have introduced competition into the 
sector. 
• Allowed chronic nonpayment by budget-funded customers, protected by political 
intervention at both local and Federal levels. 
4. RAO UES Rossii (“UES”), which dominates the sector, must be promptly and substan-
tially restructured to improve efficiency and attract necessary investment. UES cannot 
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be efficiently managed with its current structure and state control. Such restructuring 
should clearly separate the High Voltage and Low Voltage networks and dispatch busi-
nesses (natural monopolies) from the generation and supply businesses (potentially 
competitive) of UES and the Energos. 
5. Such UES restructuring may reduce required investment in non-nuclear generation ca-
pacity to less than UES's currently expected $35 billion through 2010. However, such 
required investment is still likely to be at least $15-20 billion. In addition, smaller but 
still substantial investments are required for rehabilitation and development of electric-
ity and heat networks. 
6. Substantial increases in tariffs, 1.5 to 2.5 times year 2000 levels when measured in $US 
at market exchange rates, will be required to make essential new, privately-financed in-
vestments economically viable. 
7. The Government of Russia can keep electricity prices down only by introducing real, 
vigorous competition among generators and suppliers. 
8. The Government of Russia can attract necessary investment only if price formation is 
credible and objective, free of political manipulation and allows investors to earn a mar-
ket return on capital invested. This requires: 
• Market-based pricing of services wherever possible, and  
• Credible market-based regulation of the natural monopolies where direct market-
based pricing is not feasible. 
9. The goals of achieving real competition and market-based pricing require that UES be 
unbundled into viable, competing generation and supply companies and that control of 
those companies be privatized as soon as practicable.  
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10. The goal of credible regulation requires that the current system of administrative regu-
lation embodied in the FEC/REC structure be replaced by a qualitatively more objec-
tive, license-based regulatory scheme. 
Market structure  
Structural problems can make a good market design impossible. Structure refers primarily to 
the concentration of suppliers in a market, but it also includes other characteristics that determine a 
market’s basic competitiveness. While market architecture and rules can improve competitiveness, 
there is no design capable of making a market workably competitive if its structure is too problem-
atic. In that case, either the market must be regulated or the structure improved. Market structure 
refers to aspects of the market that cannot be designed but can be influenced by laws and regulation. 
These aspects include the concentration of suppliers and the elasticity of demand. Several mechani-
cal indicators of market structure exist, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), but they 
give only a most limited indication of a power market’s structure. Generally, market structure af-
fects the basic competitiveness of the market. Supplier concentration is the structural component 
most subject to scrutiny and is the focus of most anti-trust law.  
Now the main actors in the Russian electricity sector are the joint stock company Unified Elec-
trical Power System of Russia” (RAO UES) and the 72 Regional Distribution Companies (energos). 
The complicated ownership and operational relationship between them is in part due to trade-offs 
between central and regional interests. The Russian power system includes approximately 600 
thermal generating stations, over 100 hydro facilities and 9 nuclear power plants. Total installed ca-
pacity is 212 GW, and total distance of the power transmission and distribution network is ap-
proximately 2.5 million km. The regional energos operationally retain roughly 135 GW, including 
about 65 GW of CHP and 30 GW of smaller thermal and hydro plants. Most regional electricity 
markets are connected by the Russian integrated power grid, which is organized into seven dispatch 
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zones (Northwest, Central, Volga, Urals, N. Caucasus, Siberia and Far East 1). The entire integrated 
power grid is dispatched by a Central Dispatch Office in Moscow and RAO EES regional dispatch 
offices. The system is planned on the basis that each of the seven regions should have adequate ca-
pacity to meet its own needs, with the grid linking the zones mainly providing reliability and some 
peak economies. In fact, connections and flows between regions are estimated at 10% of generated 
capacity overall, though the figure is higher in some regions. Independent power generators supply 
about 4% of total generation, generally at industrial locations. Summer demand is about one third 
lower than winter demand. Daily load patterns are flat owing to the relatively large industrial de-
mand, and morning and evening peaks are nearly equal. These load characteristics are important in 
relation to optimum supply system and pricing. However, price reform will have a large influence 
on these load patterns. 
In our model we will treat different zones as separate islands. This is not really true, for there is 
transmission between the regions, as outlined in the chart below. Including this transmission, how-
ever, would not drastically change our conclusions, but simply scale them down a bit. For one 
thing, the transmission capacity, when compared with the region’s overall capacity, is not very 
high: 
                                                 
1 The Far East grid is not integrated with the others. 
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Figure 1: Transfer capabilities and regional capacity in Russia 
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Source: Company data, Incotec 
 
Because of grid limitations, there will be no unified electricity market for the country of Russia 
in the foreseeable future.  Effectively, there will be six merit orders operating in Russia, defined by 
the existing grid subdivisions. Because there are few transmission lines and few stations in the Far 
East, a market based on competitive generation will not be feasible there for the foreseeable future; 
and electricity in that region will continue to be regulated.  
 
Market Architecture.  
The architecture of a market comprises the list of component sub-markets together with their 
types and linkages. Sub-Markets in Russia are the following: day-ahead market, balancing market, 
ancillary service market and forward market. 1  
 
                                                 
1 For more details see the Model of the Russian Wholesale Market [40]. 
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Market Rules (Design). 
Russian wholesale electricity market will operate on the principles of self-scheduling and mar-
ket clearing. A supply bid is simply an offer to supply energy at any price at or above the bid price, 
and similarly a demand bid is an offer to take energy at any price at or below the bid price. In Rus-
sian case companies may provide from 1 to 25 supply bids for every hour.1 With this interpretation, 
the market-clearing price (MCP) is the one that equates supply and demand. No system optimiza-
tion is involved, and it is each supplier’s responsibility to schedule its own plants optimally to pro-
vide the energy sold. Settlements are made at the MCP in each market, so a supplier can deviate 
from its day-ahead schedule by trading the difference in the hour-ahead market or the real-time 
market. This simplicity hides considerable complexity, however. In the day-ahead market, the price 
for each hour of delivery the next day is determined independently of the others. No account is 
taken of intertemporal constraints at the system level. Startup and ramping are chosen by each sup-
plier individually. Similarly, spatial factors such as local generation required by the system operator 
for grid reliability are ignored in the energy exchange; the system operator obtains assurance that it 
can call on the requisite resources via long-term contracts. Transmission constraints are ignored in 
the exchange’s initial market clearing. Congestion is alleviated by selecting among offered adjust-
ment bids (incs and decs) in a separate after-market run by the system operator. The system opera-
tor absorbs the cost of intra-zonal congestion management conducted in real-time using supplemen-
tal incs and decs offered on short notice. Ancillary services are also ignored initially. The system 
operator conducts separate markets for the various reserve services, but also each exchange has the 
option to self-provide reserves. From these three aspects omitted from the market clearing it is evi-
dent that the design of such exchanges is intended to isolate the energy markets as much as possible 
                                                 
1 So, generator may provide up to 600 bids per day. That is why it is reasonable for generators to calculate a sup-
ply curve; otherwise, recalculating 25 bids for every hour may be very complicated. This is another reason for us to use 
the SFE. 
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from the others. The day-ahead markets for transmission adjustments and ancillary services are 
conducted separately by the system operator after the close of the energy markets. Only the residual 
energy market for real-time balancing and load following is conducted directly by the system opera-
tor.  
Timing1  
During the year: participants may sell energy using bilateral contracts and must inform the 
System Operator (SO) about those contracts.  
Day-ahead (X): players receive demand forecasts, hydropower plants production forecasts, 
congestion forecasts from the SO for the following day for every hour, and using this information 
provide their supply bids to the SO. 
Day X+1: the SO sets the market-clearing price using supply bids of players and publishes 
equilibrium quantities and prices in Internet. 
 
Proposed structural changes  
In our research we will analyze set up of SMUEK (Middle Volga Interregional Managing 
Power Company).  This is not a usual merger, because none assets of regional energos were placed 
with SMUEK which performance is regulated by the legislation in force laws stipulating the trans-
fer of the executive powers to the managing company. Thus, director general powers were con-
veyed to SMUEK: Samaraenergo (16.02.2001), Ulianovskenergo (13.04.2001), Saratovenergo 
(21.05.2001), Kalmenergo (28.05.2001). Still all above companies remained independent with the 
assets being left in the holders’ ownership. When we started our research intentions of RAO UES 
about merging regional energos was not clear. However, in March 2002 SMUEK management pro-
posed to merge all SMUEK companies into single one.  RAO UES is going to support this plan. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
1 According to the Model of the Russian Wholesale Market [40]. 
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New structure will allow management to coordinate production levels and influence on equilibrium 
prices.  
Unified Energy Systems of Russia also plans to set up Northern Power Management Company 
to manage the Vologdaenergo, Arkhenergo and Kostromaenergo power companies. Far Eastern 
Power Management Company will manage Dalnergo and Luchegorsk Fuel and Energy Company. 
In addition, UES plans to set up Caucasian Power Management Company to manage Ingushenergo, 
Karachaevo-Cherkesskenergo, Sevkavkazenergo and Kabbalkenergo. Volzhsky Hydroelectric 
Kaskad has also been set up to manage Volzhsky-based Volzhskaya Hydroelectric Power Plant and 
Zhigulevsk-based Volzhskaya Hydroelectric Power Plant.  
We will also analyze possible entry of new independent power producers (IPPs). Possible can-
didates for new entry are foreign energy companies and oil companies by using high efficiency 
combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) to utilize gas from oil and gas fields, because now they do not 
have free access to gas pipelines.   
 
METHODOLOGY 
To analyze the wholesale electricity market in Russia we will use the supply function equi-
librium (SFE) model that directly take into account the specific features of electricity markets.  
Klemperer and Meyer (1989) modeled an oligopoly facing uncertain demand, and argued that 
in such an environment firms would prefer to set supply functions, rather than compete in prices 
(Bertrand competition) or quantities (Cournot competition). They observed that under demand un-
certainty - given any hypothesized behavior by other firms (i.e. price or quantity setting) - the resid-
ual demand facing each firm is uncertain, and hence each firm has a set of profit maximizing points 
(price-quantity pairs), one corresponding to each realization of its residual demand. If firms must 
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decide on their strategies in advance of the realization of demand, then they are better off specifying 
an entire supply curve, rather than a single price or quantity. Green and Newbery (1992) applied 
this model to the electricity industry reforms in England and Wales (E&W). Green (1996) 
used a linear version of this model and applied it to the prospective divestitures of genera-
tion assets mandated by the regulator of the electricity industry in E&W. Baldick, Grant, and 
Kahn (2000) offer a generalization of Green’s model and extend the application to subse-
quent changes in the horizontal structure of the electricity market in E&W, beyond those 
studied by Green. Restructuring in Russia has many features of E&W experience. Recent reforms 
of the electricity industry around the world have stimulated numerous studies of oligopoly behavior 
in restructured electricity markets. Papers of this kind have been published reflecting issues in 
Scandinavia, Spain, New Zealand, and U.S. electricity markets, particularly California.1 The SFE 
model formulation at least offers the possibility of developing some insight into the bidding behav-
ior of firms, particularly in markets where they are constrained to bid consistently over an extended 
period of time. One recent example of this application is the use of the SFE framework by the Mar-
ket Monitoring Committee of the California Power Exchange (Bohn, Klevorick, and Stalon (1999)).  
 
FORMULATION OF THE BASIC MODEL  
In the SFE model, functional forms must be specified for demand, cost, and supply functions.  
Demand 
A major problem associated with practical use of the SFE model is the representation of de-
mand. The plausibility of price forecasts with these models depends substantially on how the de-
mand curve is specified. A good part of the problem of representing demand involves how the de-
                                                 
1 For Scandinavia, see Andersson and Bergman (1995). For Spain, see Alba et al (1999), Ramos et al (1998) and 
Rivier et al (1999). For New Zealand, see Read and Scott (1996). In all three of these countries hydro plants plays an 
important role. For the US, see Borenstein and Bushnell (1998). US markets typically involve network congestion is-
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mand curve is “anchored” in price-quantity space. Green and Newberry (1992) use an estimate of 
pre-competition marginal costs and production to anchor their demand curve. In our research we 
will follow Green (1996) and will use a demand curve in the form of  
ptNtpD γ−= )(),(      ( 1 ) 
with N(t) specified as a load curve and a slope parameter γ.  
 
Price elasticity and slope parameter 
Green (1996) use parameter 0.5 GW/(£/MWh). This value is considerably higher than what 
other authors use. Green and Newberry (1992) use parameters 0.1, 0.25, and 0.5 GW/(£/MWh), re-
sulted elasticity at equilibrium: 0.25, 0.4, and 0.64. Bushnell (1998) uses 0.1 GW/(£/MWh). Bunn 
and Day (1999) use values between 0.01 GW/(£/MWh) and 0.10 GW/(£/MWh).  
Filippini (1999) estimated the price elasticity to be 0.30 for residential electricity demand using 
aggregate data at a city level for 40 Swiss cities over the period 1987 to 1990. The estimated price 
elasticity for different industrial sub-sectors range from 0.21 to 0.6 in Denmark according to 
Bjørner and Jensen (2000). Atkinson and Manning (1995) calculated average price elasticity about 
0.5 (Minimum 0.06, Maximum 1.06) from studies published between 1975-1993. In Russia the En-
ergy Research Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences (ERI RAS) estimated price elasticity to be   
0.16…0.26 [29]. We find that the range of parameters 30…60 MW/($/MWh) bracket the correct 
value of implied levels of elasticity of market price.  
Load duration curve 
We will analyze monthly demand using data from Goskomstat (1996-1999). The load curve in 
Middle Volga is very similar to the whole Russia and will use average load curve as a proxy of 
Middle Volga load curve adjusted by the region specific factors (average capacity utilization, net-
                                                                                                                                                                  
sues. Network congestion is treated in an oligopoly context by Hogan (1995) and by Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft 
(1999). 
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work losses).   Average capacity utilization in Middle Volga is about 42,2% and network losses are 
very high  - 15%.  
In Russia information about hourly consumption for different consumption classes is unavail-
able. However, we will use available data about consumption in Russia and SDG&E Static Load 
Profiles 1999.1 Using this data we will estimate load duration curve N(t) for every consumption 
class, e.g. residential. In Russia, the price structure subsidizes residential relative to commercial in-
dustrial users.  We believe, that after reform the pricing of electricity consumption will be more 
close to marginal cost of consumed energy. After that we will find hourly demand using consump-
tion structure for analyzed region. This will allow us to find effective price structure in the region 
and compare this structure with the current one.  
 
 
Table 1: Structure of electricity consumption in Russia, Middle Volga and San Diego 
  San Diego RAO UES Middle Volga 
Industry 55,8% 75,5% 74,1% 
Agricultural 1,0% 4,3% 2,20% 
Residential 43,2% 20,2% 23,7% 
 
Using data from Table 1 we will adjust load duration curve in San Diego for Russian consump-
tion structure.  
Marginal Costs 
Next we consider the marginal cost as a function of production. There is a range of possible 
functional forms. The SFE models reported in the literature typically assume that the bidders’ mar-
ginal cost functions have zero intercept, or, equivalently, assume that all have a common intercept. 
                                                 
1 For more details see Appendix B. Load Profiling.  
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This makes the SFE easier to find. Occasionally authors attempt to defend the plausibility of this 
assumption. We argue that, at least for electricity, this assumption is neither plausible nor practi-
cally useful. We will use an asymmetric affine function with non-zero intercept. If the marginal 
costs curves are equal at full production, then assuming that the marginal costs pass through zero 
will over-estimate profits compared to the true function. The affine case will typically under-
estimate profits. The line through zero is likely to be particularly unrealistic when the actual supply 
of a firm is from the low end of its capacity. This form results in an affine marginal cost function 
for each firm: 
iiiiiii aqcqdqdCqi +=≥∀∀ )(/,0,   ( 2 ) 
with ci > 0 for each firm i for strictly convex costs. We will use cost estimates derived from 
published thermal efficiencies and fuel prices. After that we will approximate piecewise cost func-
tion by affine function.  
Supply 
Finally, consider the supply as a function of price. Typical applications use a form for the sup-
ply function that is similar to the assumed form of the marginal cost function.  
For example, Turnbull (1983) analyzes an asymmetric two-firm model with linear demand, af-
fine marginal costs, and affine supply functions. The resulting conditions for the SFE are straight-
forward to solve. Green and Newbery (1992) generalize the linear demand and linear marginal cost 
asymmetric two firm model by analyzing strategic firms having quadratic marginal costs. For the 
duopoly structure examined, Green and Newbery (1992) report results primarily for the case of 
symmetric strategic firms. As the structure of the electricity industry in E&W has changed, Baldick, 
Grant, and Kahn (2000) drop the symmetry and the duopoly assumption and improve numerical fit 
of the SFE model. The asymmetric duopoly case is also solved by Green and Newbery (1992) and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 19
by Laussel (1992). For practical applications, the asymmetric case is more interesting. This moti-
vates the use of the linear model for the asymmetric, multiple strategic firm industry we consider. 
We assume that the market rules specify that the supply function of each firm is asymmetric and 
affine; that is, of the form: 
).()(, iii ppqi αβ −=∀    ( 3 ) 
In order to take into account low demand and price levels and maximum capacity constraints 
we will follow Baldick, Grant, and Kahn (2000) and assume that the bid rules allow for piecewise 
affine, non-decreasing bid supply functions. We can construct a candidate SFE in piecewise affine 
supply functions by piecing together several supply functions. In each piece we will evaluate the 
slope of the supply functions of the firms that are actually generating. So long as the resulting com-
posite supply functions are all non-decreasing then the candidate is truly the SFE. 
The Game 
We assume that each firm submits a linear supply schedule. The strategy for firm i is formally 
αi ,βi   such that supply function )()( iii ppq αβ −=  map price into a level of output independent of 
time, t.1 We look for only noncooperative Nash equilibrium of the spot market as a single-shot 
game.1 It could be argued that these conditions will lead to a collusive equilibrium in the repeated 
game. However, we do not study this outcome. The possibility of collusion may worsen an already 
unattractive situation.   
Demand at any moment during the day is deterministic and is given by ptNpD γ−= )()( .  
There are n firms with marginal costs ( ) iiii
i
i
i aqcqdq
dC
qi +=≥∀∀ ,0, . Marginal costs and de-
                                                 
1 In practice, each firm’s bid schedule is a step function, rather than a linear function. It is an open question 
whether the bidding strategies of the firm will differ significantly if they are forced to provide a step function, or 
whether they are allowed to provide smooth schedule.  
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mand (ci , ai , γ, N(t) ) are common knowledge. The net demand facing firm i at moment t when 
other firms j =1…n, j≠i have supply schedule qi is ∑
≠
−
ij
j pqpD )()( . 
Each firm submits its supply function to the System Operator (SO) simultaneously (the day be-
fore), and the SO then determines the spot price and each firm’s supply by solving for the price-
output pair that equates supply to demand at each moment. That is, at each moment t the SO an-
nounces the lowest price such that ∑
=
=
ni
i tpqtpD
...1
))(())(( , provided that such price exists. If such a 
price does not exist, the firms are paid zero. Supply function )()( iii ppq αβ −= at any t, describes 
profit-maximizing price-output pairs.  Firms choose αi,βi such that profit-maximizing solution can 
be found by maximizing profit )()( iiii qCpqp −=π  with respect to p given qj   j =1…n,  j≠i:  
∑∑
≠≠
−−−=∀
ij
ji
ij
ji pqpDCpqpDppi )]()([])()([)(π  
( )[ ] 0)()()(... )( =


 


 +−−−−∀ ∑∑
≠≠ ij
dp
pdq
dp
dD
idq
dC
ij
j
j
i
i pqppqpDiCOF  
( )[ ] 

 


 +−−=∀ ∑
≠ij
dp
pdq
dp
dD
idq
dC
i
j
i
i pqpqi )()(
 
( ) 

 


 +−−−=−∀ ∑
≠ij
jiiiiii apcppi βγαβαβ )()(  
Solving these equations we will find the equilibrium for our model. Changes in market struc-
ture will lead to change of firms (decision-makers) number and the forms of their marginal costs.  
 
Timing of the moves   
Day X-1: players provide their supply function to the SO simultaneously. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
1 Since the bidding process is repeated daily, we do not feel that there would be any “learning” problems in reach-
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Day X+Y hours: the SO sets the market clearing price for hour Y using supply functions of 
players and demand for hour Y.  
Day X+1: players receive their profits.  
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                  
ing equilibrium. 
time X X+1X+Y X-1 
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GENERAL APPROACH TO SFE MODEL. 
The affine SFE provides one SFE for the asymmetric affine marginal cost uncapacitated case. 
Baldick and Hogan (2001) showed that it is generally very difficult to find solutions of SFE model 
that are non-decreasing over all realized prices except in very special cases, namely: 
1. if the cost functions are the same for each firm, as explored by Klemperer and Meyer 
(1989) and Green and Newbery (1992), 
2. if the marginal costs are affine and there are no capacity constraints so that there are 
linear or affine solutions to (9), which was explored in Green (1996), Rudkevich 
(1999), Baldick, Grant, and Kahn (2000), or 
3. if the load factor over the time horizon is very close to 100%. 
However, Wolak and Patrick (1997) showed that capacity constraints play an important role in 
empirical examples.   
They constructed their estimate of the marginal cost function based on supply schedules for 
National Power and PowerGen by the following procedure:  
   “For each genset owned by these two firms we first compute the maximum amount of actual 
availability declared within any load period during the calendar year 1995. We think of this as a 
lower bound on maximum capacity available from each genset. For each genset we then compute 
the minimum bid price offered for that genset in any load period when this maximum availability is 
offered during the year. We can think of this minimum genset bid as an upper bound on the mar-
ginal cost of that genset. Ordering these maximum genset availabilities from the lowest to highest 
minimum price, and then aggregating the total amount offered at less than or equal to each price 
yields the solid line given in each figure. We believe this process yields an upper bound on the true 
marginal cost function. “ 
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Figure 2: Wolak and Patrick marginal cost function estimates  
 
Thus, it is more reasonable to analyze solution in affine capacity constrained case. Thus we 
will introduce a more general framework for SFE model. This includes piecewise-linear supply 
curves, capacity constraints, price caps and floors. The model is close to described above. One pos-
sible description of the model you can find in Appendix D.  The solution can be only numerical, so 
we use different software and optimization methods from this software to calculate results. The 
model was implemented using Visual Basic, Excel Optimization Toolbox and Matlab.  
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EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE  
In our empirical example we analyzed proposed structural changes in the Middle-Volga Re-
gion.  
Table 2: Main players in Middle Volga 
 Capacity, 
MW 
Production in 
1995, GWh 
Number of 
power 
plants 
Tatenergo 5829 20581 8 
Samaraenergo 2675 12051 7 
Chuvashenergo 1400 4000 3 
Saratovenergo 1246 4044 5 
Ulianovskenergo 768 2540 2 
Penzaenergo 375 1338 3 
Mordovenergo 340 934 3 
Marienergo 80 464 1 
 
 We analyze the effect of merging of Samaraenergo, Saratovenergo and Ulianovskenergo into 
one company. After that we will analyze the entry of new independent power producers (IPPs) 
1600MW.  
Marginal cost functions  iiiiiii aqcqdqdCqi +=≥∀∀ )(/,0,  
 
Stage1:  
 
In this case we analyze situation as it is. 
Thus, the result will serve as a base for compari-
son of possible changes.  
  
a c Capacity
Tatenergo 4,69389 0,00213 7003,0
Chuvashenergo 10,08853 0,00155 1370,0
Samaraenergo 12,83857 0,00241 3494,7
Saratovenergo 11,81821 0,00459 1502,0
Ulianovskenergo 14,21815 0,00121 862,0
 
 
Stage2:  
 
In this case Samaraenergo, Saratovenergo 
and Ulianovskenergo are merged into single 
company.  
a c Capacity
Tatenergo 4,69389 0,00213 7003,0
Chuvashenergo 10,08853 0,00155 1370,0
SMUEK 12,75031 0,00127 5858,7
 
 
Stage 3: 
 
Stage 4: 
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In this situation we will analyze effect of 
entry of a new player (Independent Power Pro-
ducer).  
 
  
a c Capac-ity 
Tatenergo 4,69389 0,00213 7003,0
Chuvashenergo 10,08853 0,00155 1370,0
IPP  5,00000 0,00100 1500,0
SMUEK 12,75031 0,00127 5338,7
 
 
In this situation we will analyze effect of 
entry of a new player in the base case. This will 
allow us to analyze effect of merger on entry in-
centive.  
  
a c Capac-ity 
Tatenergo 4,69389 0,00213 7003,0
Chuvashenergo 10,08853 0,00155 1370,0
Samaraenergo 12,83857 0,00241 3494,7
IPP  5,00000 0,00100 1500,0
Saratovenergo 11,81821 0,00459 1502,0
Ulianovskenergo 14,21815 0,00121 862,0 
 
 
Demand 
ptNtpD γ−= )(),(  
As we previously found slope parameters (γ): 30, 45, and 60 may be used to analyze restructuring in 
Middle Volga.    
 
Figure 3: Average Load Curve, Russia  (1996-1999) (Average capacity utilization=42,2%) 
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Solution  
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In our solution of the SFE model we will follow Baldick, Grant, and Kahn (2000).  
∑
≠
+−=∀
ij
jiii ci }){1(, βγββ   ,i∀ αi = ai.  
Case 1 (γ = 30): 
 
Stage 1:   
  alpha beta 
Tatenergo 4,69 358,00 
Chuvashenergo 10,09 443,64 
Samaraenergo 12,84 326,75 
Saratovenergo 11,82 192,70 
Ulianovskenergo 14,22 513,69  
 
Stage 2:  
  alpha beta 
Tatenergo 4,69 282,67 
Chuvashenergo 10,09 327,51 
SMUEK 12,75 352,72 
 
 
Stage 3: 
  alpha beta 
Tatenergo 8,94 116,72
Chuvashenergo 6,72 108,13
IPP  9,52 53,82
SMUEK 6,00 108,23 
Stage 4: 
  alpha beta 
Tatenergo 4,69 391,60 
Chuvashenergo 10,09 501,24 
Samaraenergo 12,84 353,67 
IPP  5,00 674,85 
Saratovenergo 11,82 200,66 
Ulianovskenergo 14,22 598,36 
 
 
 
Using these numbers we can find a solution for the SFE model. On the graph we can see price 
variations during the year in case of slope parameter equal to 30.  
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Figure 4: Affine-linear SFE solution (slope parameter=30)  
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We received interesting result, that merger does not change considerably entry incentives. En-
try of IPP with and without merger lead to prices, which differ only by 5% compared to 13% differ-
ence in pre-entry situation with and without merger and 44% price decrease after entry of IPP after 
merger.  
Rational IPP would predict such results, so merger will provide quiet small additional incentive 
to entry. However, if IPP believe that prices will stay on the same level as before entry, merger and 
resulted higher prices can provide additional incentive for new entrants.  
 
 
 
 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
Weighted Average Prices, 
$/MWh 
14,50 16,34 11,31 11,92 
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Effect of changes in slope parameter  
Now we will analyze how results will change due to variations of slope parameter.  
Figure 5: Affine-linear SFE solution (slope parameter=45)  
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Figure 6: Affine-linear SFE solution (slope parameter=60)  
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We can see that slope parameter does not considerably affect equilibrium prices. We weighted 
price curve by load and found that in case of gamma increase from 30 to 60 price changes only by 
2%, compared to 13% price variation along our load curve.  
Table 3: Effect of changes in gamma on price for Stage 1. 
  gamma=30 gamma=45 gamma=60 
  Load Weighted Average Prices, 
$/MWh 14,50 14,36 14,24 
 
We can also see that changes in slope parameter cause small changes in prices on the graph.  
Figure 7: Affine-linear SFE. Effect of changes in slope parameter.  
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However, in this model capacity constraints are not taken into account. Practical experience 
shows that most cases of market power on power markets are result of ability of large electricity 
companies to exhaust competitor’s capacity and exploit residual demand. 
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Capacitated SFE 
To handle capacity constraints we will use capacitated SFE model and iterative approach. Now 
our model is more sophisticated, so we can analyze more extreme cases. To analyze all possible 
variants we will use specific load-duration curve L=0,27+0,72t. 
Figure 8: Load Duration Curve for general SFE.  
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We will use demand slope at level γ =30 and will analyze effect of merger. As a starting point 
for iterations we will use results from previous chapter.  Below we can find the results of calcula-
tions. 
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Figure 9: Price variations. (Stage 2. No price caps).  
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Figure 10: Supply curves. (Stage 2. No price caps).  
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Figure 11: Price variations. (Stage 1. No price caps).  
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Figure 12: Supply curves. (Stage 1. No price caps).  
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We found that load weighted average prices increased as a result of merger by 27% is quiet 
similar to incapacitated model (28%).  Though, we cannot compare directly price levels in our 
models because of the difference in load duration curves, we can see that price level in capacitated 
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model is much higher than in incapacitated model.  This is result of specific characteristics of elec-
tricity markets.  Low demand will lead to equilibrium prices, which are close to marginal costs, but 
increase of demand will lead to substantial higher prices.  
Figure 13: Low  demand      Figure 14: High demand  
The equilibrium prices will be very volatile and will change rapidly according to demand fluc-
tuations.  
Figure 15: California PX Prices and predicted MC: January 1999 
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Rapid demand increase may cause the market failure. Three conditions are necessary for fail-
ure: (1) inelastic demand, (2) inelastic supply, and (3) volatile demand. Given the proper realization 
of these conditions, imagine starting with too much generating capacity. As capacity decreases to-
ward an equilibrium level, short-run profit will increase, but before it becomes great enough to 
cover fixed costs, the supply and demand curve will fail to intersect.  
Figure 16: Market failure 
This is market failure. Price is pushed toward infinity, but even an infinite price cannot clear 
the market. 
Current power markets probably satisfy the conditions required for this failure, that is why 
price caps should be introduced.  
Q 
MC, Price 
MC
Demand
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Price Caps regulations 
Price caps are widely used around the world. FERC in USA approved price limits of $750, 
$500 and $250/MWh for California between 1998 and August 2001. In the summer of 2000 it re-
duced the NY ISO’s limit from its previously approved level of $10,000 to $1,000/MWh bringing it 
in line with PJM’s limit. A year later it limited prices indirectly in the West to roughly $100/MWh. 
In between it suggested that what Western markets really needed was no price limit at all. The Aus-
tralians tell us prices must be capped at the value of lost load, which they put at between $15,000 
and $25,000/MWh AU. The new electricity trading arrangement in England allows much higher 
prices and promptly set a record of over $50,000/MWh.   
However, price caps regulation is ambiguous. As California’s wholesale power prices rose rap-
idly in the spring of 2000, the state Independent System Operator (ISO) was quick to impose a price 
cap. As a result, amount of power supplied to the state dropped off as suppliers pursued more lucra-
tive opportunities out-of-state. Because consumer prices were not affected (as a result of retail price 
cap), consumers did not reduce demand, and acute scarcity turned into shortages. The situation rap-
idly grew untenable, with ISO staff spending more time trying to hustle up power supplies than 
running the grid. As supplies continued to fall, the ISO had to lift the caps to head off blackouts. 
Contrast this unfolding of events with the previous "worst-case scenario" of the price spikes in the 
Midwest in the summer of 1998: price caps were not imposed, market prices attracted both power 
and investment to the region, and now new power plants are being built. The price spike problem in 
the Midwest has not recurred. 
Now we will introduce price cap at the level p=80 $/MWh and will find the effect on our ca-
pacitated model.   
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Figure 17: Price variations. (Stage 2.  Price cap at level 80 $/MWh). 
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Figure 18: Supply curves. (Stage 2. Price cap at level 80 $/MWh).  
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Figure 19: Price variations. (Stage 1.  Price cap at level 80 $/MWh).  
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Figure 20: Supply curves. (Stage 1. Price cap at level 80 $/MWh).  
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We found that in this model introduction of price caps may lead to situation when producers 
for a long period sell energy at regulated prices.  Thus, introduction of low price caps may result: 
reduced supply, less conservation, higher off-peak prices, longer-term distortions of investment and 
resource consuming opportunistic behavior in the market.  
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Analysis of effective prices for different industries. 
 
Now we will analyze prices for different consumers classes. Consumption during the day may 
vary greatly during the year and during the week. On weekends consumption of industrial sectors 
decreases and consumption of residential sector rises.  Fundamental factors for price variations dur-
ing the day are very similar for different countries and regions and depend from geographic loca-
tion, temperature and sunshine duration. However, average load for different regions have less dif-
ference than variations of daily load during the year. So, using adjusted USA data for Russia will 
provide some useful insights. The solution process is the same as in previous paragraph.  
Figure 21: Hourly Load Duration Curve, San Diego. 
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Figure 22: Load Duration Curve 
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Figure 23: Daily prices 
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  Load Weighted Average Prices, $/MWh
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Figure 24: Price structure for different classes 
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We can see that price structure in Middle Volga is far for effective. We received that in effec-
tive price structure prices for industrial and residential consumers do not differ very much (less than 
1%). This is a result of large share of industrial consumers in whole consumption. In developed 
countries prices for industrial consumers are smaller than for residential users.  
Figure 25: Industrial to residential price ratio (North American Electric Reliability Council) 
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Industrial consumers have more market power and may have direct access to the wholesale 
market and use competition between generating companies to receive more favorable prices. An-
other reason is difference distributional costs. Residential consumers require more meters and bill-
ing operations than industrial users. According to our estimates tariffs for industrial and residential 
consumers should be one percent high plus the difference in distributional costs.  Abolition of cross-
subsidization will increase efficiency of electricity sector.   
 
POLICY CONCLUSION 
Restructuring of electricity sector in Russia may cause drastic price changes.  Network con-
straints in Russia will lead to formation of several nearly independent energy zones. During the re-
structuring process Government should take into account market power also in energy zones, not 
only in whole Russia. Otherwise, some energy companies will exploit the constraints on the grid’s 
transmission capacity, since their market power in those regional submarkets is considerably greater 
than in the country as a whole. In short-term this may lead to substantial price rise. However, in 
long-term the situation is ambiguous. To improve situation in long-term we should consider follow-
ing policies.   
At the federal level:  
Create incentives to improve the transmission grid. Wholesale electricity competition is con-
strained by the inability of the national grid to efficiently manage power flows that the market de-
mands in real time, and to accommodate longer-term shifts in supply and demand. This is funda-
mentally an interregional issue, and the federal government must move more quickly to hammer out 
acceptable policies governing transmission assets, access, and investment that both ensure reliabil-
ity and provide investors in new transmission capacity with sufficient financial returns and regula-
tory certainty.  
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Do not hinder generation capacity markets. While the needs and issues of electricity generation 
cannot drive the entire nation’s energy and environmental policies, there should be accommodation 
for adding new generation capacity. Facilitating new generation capacity will speed the replacement 
of old, dirty, and inefficient plants with new, cleaner, efficient plants—resulting in more power 
from less fuel and less emissions.  
Create a plan for phasing out retail price caps. First, move from “cost plus” to price caps regu-
lations. Second, gradually but predictably raise the price caps. Convene a working group to create 
an initial schedule and revise the schedule periodically as market conditions change. 
Next, tie rate cap increases to milestones in accomplishing other policy changes that increase 
competition and customer choice in the market and reduce utilities’ market power. If other policy 
changes are successful in allowing market entry and new competitive choices for consumers as well 
as increased electricity supply, the timetable to remove price caps can be moved up. 
Meanwhile, implement a system to guard against exercise of vertical and horizontal market 
power. Until consumers have options in the face of high prices or bad service from utilities, regula-
tory oversight is necessary. 
Finally, encourage utilities to implement real-time pricing and metering so that consumers can 
adjust their use of electricity as prices change. Implementing real-time pricing and metering can 
also justify accelerating the schedule for removing price caps. 
Free the utilities to purchase power competitively. A spot market is a necessary component of 
the overall electricity market. But centralized mandatory pools bring to the market perverse incen-
tives and rigidities that create distortions and an inability to adapt to changing market conditions. 
Encourage a voluntary, independent competitive exchange and develop bidding rules that attract 
both buyers and sellers. At the same time, the utilities need to add forward contracts to their portfo-
lios to hedge against future wholesale power price fluctuations. 
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APPENDIX A. MARGINAL COSTS. 
 
To calculate marginal costs we will use marginal consumption of fuel and the following assumptions 
about fuel prices.  We used the following information about 830 power plants from Incotec (1999) (Printed 
Edition): disposable capacity, electricity production, thermal energy production, marginal use of fuel in elec-
tricity production, marginal use of fuel in thermal energy production, structure of used fuel, depreciation of 
capital. 
Fuel prices: 50% of Western European levels (defined as the average price during the past 20 years), 
except for fuel oil: 
? Gas: $40/fuel equivalent tonne (185% increase from 1999) 
The government has indicated that gas prices are to be allowed to increase some 2-fold over the coming 
two years, from today’s $17 per 1000 cu m. We believe it is overwhelmingly likely that the target price of 
$40 will be reached by 2005. 
? Fuel oil: $100 (132% increase from 1999)  
Fuel prices are currently quite high in Russia relative to Western Europe. As local refineries improve 
their output mix, prices should rise. However, these prices are unlikely to rise as quickly as those for other 
fuels. In any event, few local power stations currently use fuel oil, and fuel oil will likely remain an expen-
sive source of electricity. 
? Coal: $25 (212% increase from 1999)  
Coal prices have been assumed to reach $25/ton by 2005. This is somewhat arbitrary, as there are no 
quoted world prices for Russian-quality coal. It seems roughly reasonable in view of local costs, however. 
? Coal transport: 100% increase (same level as in Western Europe and the US) 
Russia’s transport fees (on a per tonne/per km basis) were about half those of the US and Western 
Europe in 1999. They are unlikely to exceed this after completion of the planned railroad reform. 
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APPENDIX B. LOAD PROFILING. 
The electricity consumption of most customers is metered only on a monthly basis, while wholesale 
purchases are metered and billed on an hourly basis. Thus, it is impossible to know the actual wholesale cost 
of serving a given retail customer, because this cost depends upon how much unmeasured power that cus-
tomer is consuming each hour. In order to resolve the contradiction of providing a power resale service to 
customers whose consumption cannot be directly observed, a process known as “load-profiling” was created/ 
Under this process, the distribution utilities develop estimates of end-use consumption that is aggregated by 
customer class. Thus, for example, the wholesale cost of serving a residential household in San Diego is es-
timated using the average hourly price in the Power Exchange (plus other transaction fees) weighted accord-
ing to the average hourly consumption of all households in the SDG&E service territory.  
SDG&E developed the 1999 static load profiles based upon a three (3) year average of electrical use 
(1994-1996). Rate class load estimates are presented in kWh and local time.  
Rate Class 1994-1996 Averages 
Class #Customers Share of demand  
Agricultural 3,522 1% 
Large Com/Ind 599 13% 
Medium Com/Ind 17,485 28% 
Residential 1,090,003 44% 
Small Commercial 109,284 9% 
Schedule AD 595 1% 
Schedule A6 11 5% 
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Figure 26: Load Curves for Russia and SDG&E Static Profile 1999 
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Figure 27: Load Duration Curves for Russia and SDG&E Classes 
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Figure 28: Hourly Load Curve for different classes, SDG&E 
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Figure 29: Hourly Load Duration Curves, SDG&E 
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Figure 30: Monthly Load Curve, PDG&E 
0,0%
2,0%
4,0%
6,0%
8,0%
10,0%
12,0%
14,0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Lrg C/I >500 kW
Med C/I <500 kW
Small Comercial
Agricultural
Residential
 
Figure 31: Monthly Load Duration Curve, PDG&E 
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APPENDIX C. POWER INDUSTRY DATA 
Figure 32: Share of thermal power stations in Russia 
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Figure 33: Capacity breakdown, by type, 1999 
 
0% 
20% 
40% 
60% 
80% 
100% 
NorthWest Center MidVolga Ural North.
Caucasus
Siberia 
thermal
independent
nuclear
hydro 
 
Source: Goskomstat 
 52
 
Figure 34: Thermal capacity, 1999 
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Figure 35: National capacity and demand 
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APPENDIX D.  GENERAL SFE MODEL. 
This appendix closely follows Baldick and Hogan (2001): 
Price cap and price minimum 
Price caps are in place in many electricity markets. The detailed implementation of the price 
caps varies from market to market. To represent the effect of a generic price cap on the market, we 
follow von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) and assume that the market rules specify a price cap p and 
that the firms are obliged to bid supply functions that satisfy: 
( ) ii qpSi =∀  ( 4 ) 
That is, each firm must be willing to operate at full output if the price reaches the price cap. Of 
course, firms might also bid so that they would be prepared to produce at full output for lower 
prices. 
As discussed in Borenstein (2001), enforcement of this requirement necessitates that the mar-
ket operator be prepared to curtail demand and not breach the price cap. Furthermore, the market 
operator must be able to reliably estimate the maximum marginal cost of production by any firm in 
the market so that the price cap can be set above the maximum marginal cost of production. 
We assume for convenience that there is a known minimum price p  below which no firm 
would be prepared to bid any non-zero supply. 
For example,  { }ii ap min=  is a suitable value since no firms will be willing to generate for 
a price that falls below the marginal operating costs at zero output of the cheapest generator. 
Feasible and allowable supply functions 
We require that each supply function be defined for every price in the interval [ ]pp ; . To be 
feasible the range of the supply function for firm i must be contained in the interval [ ]iq;0 . That is, 
the supply function for firm i is a function [ ] [ ]ii qppS ;0;: → . Market rules require that supply 
 55
functions be non-decreasing in order to be allowable as bids. That is, ( ) ( )pSpSpp ii ′≤⇒′≤ . The 
requirement that each supply function be feasible and allowable is embodied in the following:  
 
Definition of supply function 
  For each ni ,,1 K= , the set Si is the function space of feasible and allowable supply functions 
for firm i having domain [ ]pp ; . That is, Si  is the set of functions with domain [ ]pp ;  that: 
1. have range [ ]iq;0  (so that all bids are feasible for allowed prices) and  
2. are non-decreasing over the domain [ ]pp ; , (so that the function is an allowable supply 
function). 
Further we analyze differential equations with solutions that yield supply function equilibria, 
we will further restrict Si to be the space of differentiable functions that are feasible and allowable. 
In this case, the non-decreasing constraints are equivalent to: 
[ ] ( ) 0,;,,...,1 ≥′∈∀=∀ pSpppni i .  
 
Price 
At each time t ∈ [0; 1], the market is cleared based on the bid supply functions ( )iS s ni ,,1K==  
and the demand. That is, at each time t, the price is determined by the solution of:  
,)()(),( ∑=−=
i
i pSptNptD γ  ( 5 ) 
assuming a solution exists. All firms receive the marginal clearing price for their supply. We 
say that this price corresponds to the bid supply functions S. If  γ > 0 then for each t and each col-
lection of choices of non-decreasing supply functions Si there is at most one solution to (5) having 
ppp << . If there is a solution to (5) in this range, then this solution determines the price at time t. 
(If Si is discontinuous then we must modify the notion of  “a solution to (5)” slightly; however, we 
will not need to deal with this issue for the supply functions we exhibit.) If there is no solution to 
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(5) in the range ppp << , then the realized price depends on whether the market is assumed to 
have price caps or bid caps.  
Price caps  
In the case of price caps, the market price is never allowed to rise above p . If there is insuffi-
cient supply to meet the demand at price pp = then demand must be rationed. In this case, we will 
assume that:  
• demand is rationed to the available supply and 
• all energy is sold at a price equal to the price cap. 
For any particular choices niSi ,,1, K= , we can therefore implicitly solve for price as a 
function of time. That is, there is a function [ ] [ ]ppP ;1,0: → , which is parameterized by 
njS j ,,1, K= , such that: 
[ ] ∑ =≥=∈∀
i
jij njStPSnjStPtDt )),,...,1,;(()),...,1,;(,(,1,0  ( 6 ) 
with equality between the left and right hand sides except at times when demand rationing oc-
curs. For notational convenience, we will omit the explicit parameterization of the function P and 
just write it with one argument, namely, the normalized time t.  
Bid caps 
In this alternative market structure, prices can rise to higher than pp = in order to ration de-
mand based on price. That is, there is a cap on bids but not on prices. To implement the bid caps, 
we implicitly extrapolate the supply functions to being functions [ ) [ ]ii qpS ,0,: →∞  by defining: 
,)(,, ii qpSppi =∀∀ f  Moreover, we relax the upper limit on price and only require that pp ≥ . In 
this case there is always a solution to (5); however, the resulting price might exceed the bid cap p . 
Again, we can implicitly solve for the marginal clearing price as a function of time. However, price 
is now a function [ ] [ ]∞→ ;1,0: pP   
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Profit  
Given a supply function Si of firm i and also given the supply functions of the other firm, 
which we will denote by ,)( ijji SS ≠− = , we can determine the corresponding price function P. 
Moreover, at any time t the accrual of profit per unit (normalized) time to firm i is itπ : 
))).((()())(( tPSCtPtPS iiiit −=π  ( 7 ) 
 The profit iπ  to firm i over the time horizon is then given by: 
∫
∫
=
=−
−=
==∀
1
0
1
0
)))((()())((
,),(,,...,1,
t iii
t itiiij
dttPSCtPtPS
dtSSnjS ππ
( 8 ) 
That is, the profit iπ  is the integral of the profit per unit time over the time horizon.  
Equilibrium definition 
A collection of choices ,)( ,...,1
**
niiSS ==  is a Nash supply function equilibrium (SFE) if: 
{ },),(maxarg,,...,1 ** iii
SS
i SSSni
ii
−∈
∈=∀ π  
where .)( ** ijji SS ≠− =  
In the general case, firms having capacity constraints and asymmetric costs, solutions of (9) 
typically violate the non-decreasing requirements somewhere over the range of realized prices over 
the time horizon. Baldick-Hogan Theorem helps to explain why this is the case. It shows that the 
solutions of the differential equation must satisfy tight bounds in order for the solution to be non-
decreasing over a range of prices.  
In the cases of: 
1. symmetric cost functions and symmetric solutions to the differential equations or  
2. affine solutions to the differential equations with affine marginal costs,  
3. then the necessary conditions in Baldick-Hogan theorem are relatively mild. 
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If the marginal costs are not affine or if non-affine SFEs are being sought then we must return 
to the conditions:  
( )[ ] 

 


 +−−=∀ ∑
≠ij
dp
pdq
dp
dD
idq
dC
i
j
i
i pqpqi )()(  
 As discussed in Baldick, Grant, and Kahn (2000), these conditions are a set of coupled differ-
ential equations that are not in the standard form for differential equations because of the summa-
tion of the derivatives. In Baldick, Grant, and Kahn (2000) it was shown that the conditions can be 
transformed into the following standard form of non-linear vector differential equations: 
ℑ−−










−
−


 −ℑℑ−= 1
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)(
1
1)(
**
*
*
1
*
1
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1
/*
n
pSCp
pS
pSCp
pS
I
n
pS
nn
n
T γM    ( 9 ) 
where 
- S*=( )(* pSi ), i=1…n  is the vector of supply functions and 
/*S is the derivative of this vec-
tor,  
- ℑ  is a vector of all ones of length n, 
- Superscript T means transpose, and 
- I is the identity matrix.  
 
The specification of an initial condition may partly resolve the issue of the multiplicity of equi-
libria that are typically possible with supply function equilibria. That is, the price cap provides a 
public signal to the firms that may allow them to coordinate on the equilibrium satisfying  
ii qpSi =∀ )(*  which is presumably the equilibrium that yields the largest profit given the price 
cap. If the solution of the differential equation for this initial condition is non-decreasing and satis-
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fies the capacity constraints, so that the solution of the differential equation specifies an SFE, and if 
there is only one such SFE then the SFE may be a plausible outcome for the market. 
 
A difficulty with solving the differential equation (9) is related to the terms in its right hand 
side. For each firm i, we define the marginal cost conditions to be: 
[ ] .))((,, / ppSCppp ii ≤∈∀  
The marginal cost conditions characterizes prices where a firm i is selling at an operating 
profit. In numerical experiments, Baldick and Hogan (2001) found that non-affine solutions to the 
differential equations typically approached the boundary of the marginal cost conditions. That is, 
the marginal costs approach the price for certain prices. At the boundary of these conditions, the 
differential equations (9) become singular because of the terms in the denominators of the entries on 
the right hand side of (9). Nearby to the boundary of the marginal cost conditions, the differential 
equations become difficult to solve because of numerical conditioning issues. 
Baldick and Hogan (2001) showed that the singularity can be removed by augmenting the dif-
ferential equations in a manner analogous to rearranging the equations into parametric form, as dis-
cussed for the symmetric, two firm case in Klemperer and Meyer (1989).  
Even with this transformation to circumvent the problem of singular equations, the solutions to 
the differential equations will often reach and even violate the marginal cost conditions. 
They  also found that solutions to the differential equations typically failed to satisfy the feasi-
bility constraints. However, preventing the trajectory from violating the feasibility constraints or the 
marginal cost conditions poses serious conceptual problems, which we were not able to solve. 
They considered a number of approaches to modifying the differential equation to avoid solu-
tions that were not feasible or did not satisfy the marginal cost conditions. For example, Baldick and 
Hogan (2001) considered imposing the feasibility constraints explicitly in the maximization of 
profit per unit time to obtain a constrained version of the problem of maximizing profit per unit 
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time. The basic difficulty in manipulating the resulting equations into the form of a differential 
equation is that the dependence of itq on the ijS j ≠,/  is no longer invertible. That is, we can longer 
write an equation analogous to (9) with the derivatives of the supply functions given by a function 
of the supply functions. 
Baldick and Hogan (2001) also tried to model the capacity limit by adding “barrier terms” to 
the cost function that rapidly increase as the capacity is reached. However, they were not able to 
reliably generate solutions to the differential equations that satisfied the non-decreasing and capac-
ity constraints. 
The most serious difficulty with the differential equation approach to solving for the SFE is 
that the differential equations do not “automatically” satisfy the capacity or non-decreasing condi-
tions. Baldick-Hogan Theorem implies that unless the cost functions are all very similar or there are 
no capacity constraints then the non-decreasing constraints will typically be violated in a solution of 
the differential equations, unless the range of realized prices is small enough to only cover a seg-
ment of the solution that happens to be non-decreasing. Baldick and Hogan (2001) shows that even 
a very slight deviation from the affine solution results in solutions of (9) that are non-decreasing 
only over a narrow range of prices. If the load factor over the time horizon were very close to 100% 
then such a solution of (9) would be an equilibrium. 
However, if the load factor is significantly below 100% then most such solutions would violate 
the non-decreasing constraints over the range of realized prices. This analysis provides two observa-
tions. First, the usual approach to solving differential equations to obtain the SFE may not work in 
the case of heterogeneous portfolios of generation with capacity constraints when the load factor 
deviates significantly from 100%. In this case, we must explicitly impose the non-decreasing con-
straints. 
A basic criticism of the SFE approach is that there are multiple equilibria. Certainly, if every 
possible specification of the initial conditions for the differential equations (9) yielded an equilib-
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rium then this extreme multiplicity of equilibria would limit the predictive value of the SFE ap-
proach. However, when the load factor deviates significantly from 100%, many of these putative 
equilibria are ruled out by the non-decreasing constraints. This strengthens the observations by 
Klemperer and Meyer (1989) that they made for the symmetric case concerning the multiplicity of 
equilibria. Moreover, the price cap condition (4), when it is binding on the behavior of firms, further 
limits the range of potential equilibria. Such solutions could form part of an equilibrium only if ei-
ther: 1. the range of realized prices was very restricted, or, 2. there were a discontinuity in the de-
rivative of the supply functions. The first case could occur if the load factor were close to 100%. In 
this case, there would be a multiplicity of equilibria, with the range depending on the range of the 
function N, but not on the detailed dependence of N(t) on t. Conversely, extended time horizons 
having load factors well below 100% rule out many of the solutions of (9) from being supply func-
tions. In the second case, we can imagine a discontinuous change in the behavior of the firms due 
to, for example, a binding capacity constraint being reached at a particular price. In this case, we 
can imagine equilibrium solutions consisting of the union of solutions of (9) that are “pasted” to-
gether at various break-points. Baldick and Hogan (2001) confirmed this observation theoretically. 
In the next section we will show that the numerical solutions have this appearance.  
Iterations in function space 
Because of the difficulties with the differential equations approach to seeking the SFE in gen-
eral, we take an iterative numerical approach. Such numerical approaches can usually be expected 
to yield only stable equilibria, unless started at an equilibrium or unless the iterative process pro-
duces a particular iterate that happens to be an equilibrium. 
Given a current estimate of the equilibrium supply functions, denoted )(viS  at iteration ν, we 
calculate the following step directions: 
{ },S),(~maxarg, )()()()(
i
i
v
i
v
ii
v
ii
S
v
i SSSSSSi
i
−−∆
∈∆+∆+∈∆∀ π  ( 10 ) 
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where: 
-  iπ~ is an approximation to iπ , 
-  ,)( )()( ij
v
j
v
i SS ≠− = and 
-  
i
S
−
is a finite dimensional convex subset of iS  
 
Supply function subspace 
We will use piece-wise linear non-decreasing functions with break-points evenly spaced be-
tween ( p  + 0,1) and ( p + 0,1), where p  is the price minimum and p  is the price cap. At p = p , 
we define Si(p) = 0. At p = p , we require ( ) ii qpS = . That is, set of such functions is convex. For 
most cases, we used 40 break-points. We also tested some of the cases using functions with other 
numbers of break-points to investigate whether any of the results were an artifact of the number of 
break-points. 
An initial guess niSi ,,1,
)0( K= was used as a starting function to begin the iterations. We then 
update the iterates according to: )()()1(,, vi
v
i
v
i SSSi ∆+=∀∀ + αν . ]1;0(∈α  is a step-size.  
Baldick and Hogan (2001) found that a fixed step-size of   1,0=α  performed satisfactorily. 
Iterating in the function space of supply functions requires considerable computational effort at 
each iteration and is subject to the drawback that the problem of finding the search direction may 
have multiple local optima. In practice, we use an iterative local search algorithm to seek the solu-
tion of (10) and do not guarantee to and the global optimum of (10). Consequently, even if the se-
quences of converge this does not by itself prove that an equilibrium has been found. 
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BALDICK-HOGAN THEOREM 1 
Consider a niRPSi ,...,1,:
* =→   solution of the differential equation (9) on an interval of 
prices [ ]ppP ,= . If each function niSi ,...,1,* =  is non-decreasing on P  then: 
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Proof. We first prove the lower bound condition in (26). That is, we prove 
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The differential equation (9) collects together and rearranges the conditions (12) applied to 
each firm. Rearranging (12), we obtain: 
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since jpS j ∀≥ ,0)(/ by assumption. 
 
We now prove the upper bound condition in (26). That is, we prove: 
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Let iI be the vector of all zeros, except in the i-th place where it is equal to 1 for any Pp∈ , 
 
),(0 /* pSi≤  
                                                 
1 proved by Baldick and Hogan (2001) 
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Rearranging we obtain: 
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